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During the 2000 presidential race, then Texas Governor
George W. Bush advocated transforming and reforming how the
Department of Defense (DoD) acquires new weapon systems. 
He promised a “revolution” that would “skip a generation of
technology,” in order to “move on to futuristic weapons
without necessarily buying all those in development.”  This
thesis examines President Bush’s proposal and analyzes the
potential impact on DoD and the defense industry. 
Ultimately the research revealed that there are ways to
improve the acquisition process and protect the defense
industry.  The primary conclusion of the research is that
it is feasible to skip current weapon systems in
development, in order to begin research and development of
the next-generation weapon systems.  However, DoD will be
impacted through higher operations and sustainment (O&S)
costs to sustain existing weapon systems if weapon systems
currently in development are skipped.  The acquisition
professionals that participated in this study believe these
O&S costs could increase up to 10% per year for anywhere
from five to 20 years depending on the type of system. 
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This thesis examines President George W. Bush’s
proposal to skip a generation of weapons system technology
currently in the Department of Defense (DoD) development
and procurement process, and determines the potential
impact the proposal will have on DoD and the defense
industry.  To accomplish this goal, the reader will be
given the necessary background knowledge of the DoD
acquisition process and an understanding of how DoD
develops and assesses mature technology.  Furthermore, this
thesis will establish how long a generation of technology
lasts for different types of weapon systems and define what
“skipping a generation of technology” means.  The ultimate
goal of this study is to uncover the feasibility of
skipping current weapon systems in development, in order to
begin research and development of the next-generation
weapon systems.  The research results are examined and
recommendations provided to help effectively implement this




In the 1990’s, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
rapidly changing threat environment, reduced resources, and
changes in technology development, significantly effected
the Department of Defense and how it acquired new weapon
systems.  DoD’s share of the federal budget went from 27.3%
of federal outlays in 1987 to 15.9% in 2002 (FY 2003
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Defense Budget 2003, p. 217).  In constant dollars, DoD
funding steadily declined from a peak in the mid-1980s
until the beginning of the twenty-first century when the
funding trend started to reverse.  The steady decrease in
DoD funding resulted in Secretary of Defense William
Perry’s Acquisition Reform Initiatives and three major
congressional acquisition reform acts between 1994 and
1996.
The Introduction To Defense Acquisition Management
(IDAM) Fifth Ed., states that the Department of Defense’s
vision of Acquisition Reform is:  “DoD will be recognized
as the world’s smartest, most efficient, and most
responsive buyer of best-value goods and services that meet
our warfighters’ needs from a globally competitive national
industrial base (IDAM, 2001, p. 15).”  Implementing this
vision means taking advantage of the best commercial items
and practices, awarding contracts based on best overall
value, looking at cost as an independent variable, and
fostering cooperation and teamwork among all functional
areas in product development.  DoD’s reforms significantly
streamlined systems acquisitions and forced DoD to make
trade-offs and look for already existing or cheaper
alternatives.  However, DoD’s budget has reached its lowest
point as a percentage of Gross National Product since 1940
as competing domestic priorities have siphoned some of its
funds.  As we move further into this decade, more
acquisition reforms seem inevitable.
During the 2000 presidential race, then Texas Governor
George W. Bush advocated transforming and reforming how the
Department of Defense acquires new weapon systems.  Bush
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promised a “revolution” that would “skip a generation of
technology, (Cohen, 2000, p. 41)” in order to “move on to
futuristic weapons without necessarily buying all those in
development (Thompson, 2002).”  George W. Bush won the 2000
Presidential Election and was inaugurated in January 2001. 
Shortly thereafter, President Bush made good on his
campaign promise by proposing $2.6 billion more dollars for
DoD research and development in his 2002 budget “as a down
payment on the research and development effort that lies
ahead (Ruddy, 2001).”  
President Bush’s initiative targets many weapon
systems currently in procurement, some designed to fight
the old Soviet Union.  His initiative would cancel these
outdated systems and reallocate the funding to develop and
field weapon systems capable of fighting America’s emerging
threats using next-generation technology.  For defense
contractors, this initiative could mean billions of dollars
in lost revenue and “is causing jitters in the aerospace
industry and the stock market (Asker, 2001).”  Weapon
systems currently under development that may be skipped
span all DoD Departments and include the F-22 Tactical
Fighter Aircraft, the F-18E/F Fighter Aircraft, the V-22
Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft, the Comanche Scout Light Attack
Helicopter, the Crusader Mobile Artillery Piece, the DD-21
Destroyer, and the Virginia-Class Submarine.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research questions for this thesis are:
• In systems acquisition management, is it
realistic to skip a generation of weapon system
technology?
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• How will the Department of Defense and the
defense industrial base be impacted if weapon
systems currently in development are skipped?
In order to obtain the basic knowledge necessary to
develop and define the primary research questions, it was
necessary to first answer the following subsidiary
questions:
• What does “skip a generation of technology” mean?
• How does the Department of Defense develop new
technology into a weapon system?
• How does DoD determine when technology is mature?




Initial research included a thorough literature
review.  This literature review consisted of an extensive
review of books, magazine and newspaper articles, Internet
resources, and other library information resources.  A
thorough search of DoD’s current weapon systems inventory
was done using the Internet in order to compare how long
different types of weapon systems technology lasts.  Follow
on research consisted of interviews with acquisition
professionals from several DoD services.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized into the following chapters:
Chapter II:  Background – This chapter contains an
overview of the Department of Defense acquisition life-
cycle process.  The four acquisition life-cycle phases will
be thoroughly discussed, including a detail discussion on
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the System Development and Demonstration phase.  This
discussion will lead to a comparison of how long different
weapon systems technologies last.  Next, the President’s
“skip a generation of technology” proposal and some of the
weapon systems that may be skipped will be discussed. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude with the opposing view
to the President’s proposal.
Chapter III:  Research Objective and Methodology –
This chapter discusses why the research questions were
selected and provides insight into the role of new
technology in DoD, the current state of the defense
industry, and the importance of new technology and the
defense industry to DoD.  Finally, it explains the methods
used for executing the research design and the interview
questions are presented.
Chapter IV:  Data Presentation and Analysis – This
chapter presents and analyzes the data.
Chapter V:  Conclusions and Recommendations – This
chapter summarizes the results and presents the conclusions




























This chapter first discusses the basic concepts of the
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition life-cycle process,
with an emphasis on the four acquisition life-cycle phases. 
Of these four phases, the System Development and
Demonstration phase is discussed in detail to determine how
DoD develops mature technology into a weapon system.  (It
should be noted that the following discussion of the DoD
acquisition life cycle process was accurate at the time
this research was completed.  However, in August of 2002,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense effectively cancelled the
DoD governing instructions.  Revisions to the process were
unpublished at the time of this publication.)  This
discussion leads to a comparison of how long different
types of weapon systems technologies last.  After the life
span’s for different types of weapon systems technologies
are defined, the chapter focuses on the President’s ”skip a
generation of technology” proposal and a discussion of some
of the weapon systems that may be skipped.

B. THE DOD ACQUISITION LIFE CYCLE PROCESS
The DoD acquisition life cycle process is a product of
Federal policy and public laws.  “The development,
acquisition, and operation of military systems is governed
by a multitude of public laws, formal DoD directives,
instructions and manuals, numerous Service and Component
regulations, and many inter-service and international
agreements (Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p.
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11).”  These policies and laws focus the process on three
basic activities critical to managing the development and
fielding of military weapon systems:  technical management,
business management, and contract management.  The
acquisition process parallels the requirements generation
process, which comes from the user and tends to be event
driven.  It also parallels the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS), which is date driven and subject
to the constraints of the Congressional calendar (Systems
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 11). 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
translates national security interests, developed by
strategic planners, into military requirements.  The
military requirements then become budgetary requirements,
which the United States Congress considers for funding. 
“The PPBS process operates on a continuous basis; each of
the three functions of the system (planning, programming
and budgeting) operates on a near-continuous basis,
although not simultaneously on the same fiscal year.  The
process moves from broad planning considerations to more
definitive program objectives to specific budget estimates
that price out the programs (Financial Management, 2002).”
DoD uses the acquisition life cycle process to develop
and field new weapon systems as fast as possible within
acceptable technical risks.  Acquisition, as defined by the
Introduction To Defense Acquisition Management (IDAM),
includes design, engineering, test and evaluation,
production, and operations and support of DoD systems
(IDAM, 2001, p. 1).  The term “Defense acquisition”
generally applies only to weapons and information
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technology systems processes, procedures, and end products. 
The acquisition process itself is “defined by a series of
phases during which technology is defined and matured into
viable concepts, which are subsequently developed and
readied for production, after which the systems produced
are supported in the field (Systems Engineering
Fundamentals, 2001, p. 12).”
The process is broken into a series of four phases of
development, each phase assessing the maturity of the
technology in development.  Within each phase there are two
work efforts, separated by milestone decision points,
decision reviews, or interim decision reviews.  These
decision points and reviews provide both the program
manager and Milestone Decision Authorities (MDA) the
framework with which to review acquisition programs,
monitor and administer progress, identify problems, and
make corrections (IDAM, 2001, p. 54).  Figure 1, taken from
DoDI 5000.2, illustrates the acquisition process, its four
phases, and milestone decision reviews.
The acquisition process has been revised several times
in order to make it more flexible and allow the warfighter
quicker delivery of advanced technology.  The process
encourages the use of evolutionary methods to define and
develop systems and tailors the acquisition and engineering
management without altering the basic systems engineering
process (Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 11).  

1. Purpose 
The acquisition life cycle process exists to ensure
DoD uses the latest technology, programs, and product
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support necessary to achieve the United States’ national
security goals and to support its armed forces (IDAM, 2001,
p. 1).  The aim and ultimate challenge of acquisition
managers is to use the process to develop technology that
meets today’s operational requirements and meets the
requirements of tomorrow and future forces.  “The primary
objective of Defense acquisition is to acquire quality
products that satisfy user needs with measurable
improvements to mission accomplishments and operational
support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable
price (DoDD 5000.1, 2000).” 


Figure 1. The DoD Acquisition Process. (From: 
DoDI 5000.2, 2001)

The DoDD 5000.1 The Defense Acquisition System, DoDI
5000.2 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, and the
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Introduction To Defense Acquisition Management are some of
the documents that govern the acquisition process.  These
documents outline actions required of acquisition managers
developing new weapon systems in order to meet national
security and DoD goals.  They focus on performance and
results-based management to ensure the acquisition of
efficient and effective weapon systems.  The three main
areas that these DoD directives and documents help focus
acquisition managers on during product development are: 
• Translating operational needs into stable,
affordable programs
• Acquiring quality products
• Organizing for efficiency and effectiveness
(Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 11)

2. Acquisition Life Cycle’s Four Phases
DoD begins the acquisition process after determining
the existence of a valid need from the warfighter.  This
includes the study and analysis of mission areas, a mission
need analysis to determine if a non-materiel solution is
best, an assessment of alternative solutions to meet war
fighting deficiencies, and the development of system
specific performance requirements (IDAM, 2001, p. 45). 
After determining that the warfighter’s need cannot be
satisfied through existing Federal Government or commercial
industry products, a Mission Need Statement (MNS) is
drafted to describe the warfighter’s deficiency or
technological opportunity.  
From the MNS, the acquisition life cycle begins with
the Concept and Technology Development phase, the first of
the four phases.  Following the Concept and Technology
Development phase is the Systems Development and
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Demonstration phase, the Production and Deployment phase,
and finally the Sustainment and Disposal phase.
The acquisition life cycle process allows for a given
weapon system under development to enter the process at any
of the development phases.  “For example, a system using
unproven technology would enter at the beginning stages of
the process and would proceed through a lengthy period of
technology maturation, while a system based on mature and
proven technologies might enter directly into engineering
development or, conceivably, even production (Systems
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 12).”  
The Concept and Technology Development (C&TD) phase is
intended to explore alternative concepts based on
assessments of operational needs, technology readiness,
risk and affordability.  Entry into this phase does not
mean DoD has committed to the new weapon system program,
rather, it is the beginning of the acquisition process to
determine whether or not a need (typically described in an
MNS) can be met at reasonable levels of technical risk and
at affordable costs.  The decision to enter into the C&TD
phase is made formally at the Milestone A review.  This
phase, along with the other three phases are discussed in
more detail in the sections that follow. 
The key to the acquisition process is that programs
have the flexibility to enter at any of the first three
phases.  The decision as to where the program should enter
the process is primarily a function of user needs and
technology maturity.  The MDA makes the decision for which
phase a program starts in (Systems Engineering
Fundamentals, 2001, p. 13).  Using the acquisition life
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cycle process, integrated product teams and other
acquisition reform initiatives, program managers work with
potential users, contractors and developers to develop
acquisition strategies that allow delivery of capable,
appropriate weapon systems on time, on budget, and with the
performance parameters required of the user and the
evolving DoD needs.

a. Concept and Technology Development
The Concept and Technology Development phase
begins with a validated and approved Mission Need
Statement.  From the MNS, the user or user representative
develops an initial Operational Requirements Document
(ORD).  Furthermore, the program manager formulates the
program’s initial acquisition strategy, cost estimates,
acquisition program baseline, and test and evaluation
master plan (IDAM, 2001, p. 56).  
The primary purpose of this phase is to study
concepts, to define alternative concepts and to provide
information about the potential weapon system’s
capabilities and risks.  The MDA holds a decision review to
determine if key technologies are sufficiently mature to
enter development in the next phase or if further advanced
component development is necessary.  If the key
technologies involved are reasonably mature and have
already been demonstrated, the MDA may agree to allow the
system to proceed into program initiation; if not, the
system may be directed into a Component Advanced
Development stage (Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001,
p. 12).
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During the Component Advanced Development stage,
a concept that demonstrates a needed capability (but the
system architecture is not yet complete or the key
technologies are not yet mature), can enter this stage to
allow the architecture and technologies to develop.  Once
the concept is demonstrated in a relevant environment, and
DoD understands and accepts the technical and cost risks,
the C&TD phase ends and the exit criteria for the System
Development and Demonstration phase are established.  The
products of this phase are, “a defined system architecture
supported by technologies that are at acceptable levels of
maturity” to allow the concept to enter into acquisition
(Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 13).

b. System Development and Demonstration
Program initiation for DoD acquisition programs
depends on three things:  a valid requirement (found in the
ORD), maturity of technology, and funding.  These three
things are needed before a Milestone B decision and formal
systems acquisition begins.  The successful passage of a
Milestone B decision is then followed by the System
Development and Demonstration (SD&D) phase (IDAM, 2001, p.
58).  Entry into this phase may come directly as a result
of a technological opportunity and urgent user need, as
well as having come through concept and technology
development.
This phase has two stages of development, System
Integration and System Demonstration.  The system program
could enter either stage, depending on the technical
maturity level, or the stages could be combined.  A program
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that has existing system architectures, but does not have
component subsystems integrated into a complete system
enters the System Integration stage.  Before entering the
Systems Demonstration stage, the program goes through an
Interim Progress Review to confirm that the program is
progressing as planned within the phase, or to adjust the
program plan to better accommodate progress to date or
changed circumstances (IDAM, 2001, p. 59).
The System Demonstration stage begins when
subsystems have been integrated, prototypes demonstrated,
and risks are considered acceptable, followed by an interim
review by the MDA to ensure readiness.  This stage’s
purpose is to demonstrate that the weapon system has
operational utility consistent with the operational
requirements.  Engineering demonstration models are
developed and system level development testing and
operational assessments are performed to ensure that the
system performs as required.  The models are considered to
be “advanced” or “fieldable” prototypes of the final system
and the demonstrations are to be conducted in the system’s
intended operational environment (Systems Engineering
Fundamentals, 2001, p. 13).  
This phase ends once a system has been
demonstrated in an operationally relevant environment and
the exit criteria for the next phase, the Production and
Deployment phase, are established.  The product of this
phase is an integrated and tested prototype that is ready
for initial production.  The SD&D phase will be discussed
in more detail later in this chapter.
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c. Production and Deployment
Following a successful Milestone C review, a
program enters the Production and Deployment (P&D) phase
when it demonstrates technical maturity in a relevant
environment with no significant manufacturing risk.  Also,
the program must have an approved ORD, acceptable
interoperability and operational supportability, compliance
with DoD’s Strategic Plan, and have demonstrated
affordability and funding (IDAM, 2001, p. 60).  
This phase consists of two states, Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) and Full-Rate Production and
Deployment.  During the LRIP stage, enough production
systems are produced in order to perform the initial
operational test and evaluation, live fire testing, and
operational test and evaluation.  For Acquisition
Categories (ACAT) I, programs with more that $365 million
for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and
$2.19 billion for Procurement in fiscal year 2000 dollars,
and ACAT II programs, programs with more that $140 million
for RDT&E and $645 million for Procurement, LRIP is limited
to ten percent of the total production quantity.  Non-major
programs are determined by the MDA using the ACAT I and II
limit as guidance (IDAM, 2001, p. 60).  Upon completion of
the LRIP stage, the system undergoes a Full-Rate Production
Decision Review that authorizes the system to proceed to
the Full-Rate Production and Deployment stage.
During the Full-Rate Production and Deployment
stage, the weapon system is produced and fielded to the
user.  Here, the program manager insures that the systems
are produced at an economical rate and deployed in
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accordance with the user’s requirements.  Follow-on
operational test and evaluation may also be conducted to
confirm operational effectiveness and suitability, and/or
verify the correction of deficiencies.  As the system is
produced and deployed, the Sustainment and Disposal phase
begins.

d. Sustainment and Disposal
The last, and longest, phase is the Sustainment
and Disposal (S&D) phase of the program.  This phase
focuses on all elements of logistics support (for example
supply, maintenance, training, technical data, and support
equipment) and operational readiness.  This focus is
necessary to maintain and sustain the deployed system in
the most cost-effective manner possible (Systems
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 13).  
The system’s life cycle support may include a
shift from the contractor to the Government activity, or a
combination of the two during post-production transition. 
To continue to be relevant to the user, modifications and
product improvements are implemented as necessary to update
and maintain the required levels of operational capability
as technologies and threat systems evolve (Systems
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 13).  Also service life
extension programs may be considered if the system
continues to be pertinent beyond its intended life span.  
At the end of the system’s useful life, it is
disposed of in accordance with applicable laws,
regulations, and directives.  In addition to
demilitarization of the system, disposal activities also
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include recycling, material recovery, salvage or
reutilization, and disposal of by-products from development
and production (IDAM, 2001, p. 62).

C. HOW DOD DEVELOPS TECHNOLOGY INTO A WEAPON SYSTEM
Developing mature technology is one of the most
important areas in the DoD acquisition process.  New
technology enhances DoD’s ability to fight and win wars. 
Therefore, assessing when the technology is mature enough
for production is important to keeping costs under control
and getting the technology to the user at the right time. 
Using technology readiness assessments and the System
Development and Demonstration phase, DoD assesses
technological maturity and develops it into a weapon
system.  

1. Assessing When Weapon System Technology Is Mature
As previously discussed, the Milestone Decision
Authority determines when potential weapon systems
technologies are sufficiently mature during the Concept and
Technology Development phase.  This decision is based on
whether or not the technology has been demonstrated in the
relevant environment and its supporting system architecture
has been developed.  The MDAs use technology assessments
from DoD Component Science and Technology (S&T) Executives
to assist them in their decisions.  
The DoD 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major
Defense Acquisition Programs and Major Automated
Information System Acquisition Programs, gives guidance for
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technology maturity assessments.  The DoD 5000.2-R says
that:

[t]echnology maturity shall measure the degree to
which proposed critical technologies meet program
objectives.  Technology maturity is a principal
element of program risk.  A technology readiness
assessment shall examine program concepts,
technology requirements, and demonstrated
technology capabilities to determine
technological maturity.  
The [program manager] shall identify critical
technologies via the work breakdown structure. 
Technology readiness assessments for critical
technologies shall occur sufficiently prior to
milestone decision points B and C to provide
useful technology maturity information to the
acquisition review process (DoD 5000.2-R, 2002 p.
113).

The S&T Executive for each service component is
charged with directing the technology readiness
assessments.  For major acquisition programs, ACAT I
programs, he or she uses a technology readiness level (TRL)
to assess each critical technology in development.  Using a
numerical value from one to nine, “TRLs enable consistent,
uniform, discussions of technical maturity, across
different types of technologies…[and] are a measure of
technical maturity (DoD 5000.2-R, 2002, p. 113).”  Level
one, (Basic principles observed and reported), is the
lowest level and, likewise, level nine, (Actual system
proven through successful mission operations), is the
highest assessment of technology in its final form.  “TRLs
do not discuss the probability of occurrence (i.e., the
likelihood of attaining required maturity) or the impact of
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not achieving technology maturity (DoD 5000.2-R, 2002, p.
113).”  A complete table of the nine TRLs and a brief
description can be found in Appendix A. 
S&T Executives are required to submit the technology
assessments to the Component (Service) Acquisition
Executive who then forwards them to the Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Science and Technology
(DUSD(S&T)).  The DUSD(S&T) either concurs with the S&T
Executive assessment or does not concur and directs an
independent technology readiness assessment (DoD 5000.2-R,
2002, p. 113).  DUSD(S&T) assessments are then forwarded to
the MDA for final decision.  
The MDA uses these assessments to determine if the
technology is ready to exit the C&TD phase or if it needs
further research and development.  Also, if the technology
receives a high TRL, the MDA will determine if the system
enters the acquisition process at Milestone B or goes
directly to Milestone C, the start of the Production and
Deployment phase.

2. System Development and Demonstration Phase
The System Development and Demonstration phase begins
after the program successfully passes a Milestone B
decision.  From here, the Department of Defense or (Service
Component) commits to the program, provided that the
program has proven that the technology can be developed and
has validated requirements and funding.  This phase
consists of two primary stages, System Integration stage,
followed by an Interim Progress Review, and the Systems




The DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, describes the purpose of this phase as:

The purpose of the System Development and
Demonstration phase is to develop a system,
reduce program risk, ensure operational
supportability, design for producibility, ensure
affordability, ensure protection of Critical
Program Information, and demonstrate system
integration, interoperability, and utility. 
Discovery and development are aided by the use of
simulation-based acquisition and test and
evaluation and guided by a system acquisition
strategy and test and evaluation master plan
(TEMP).  System modeling, simulation, test, and
evaluation activities shall be integrated into an
efficient continuum planned and executed by a
test and evaluation integrated product team (DoDI
5000.2, 2001).  

As previously stated, entry into this phase may
come directly as a result of a technological opportunity
and urgent user need, as well as having come through
concept and technology development.  The Milestone Decision
Authority determines the entry point, which is Milestone B,
based on the maturity of the technologies, validated




The Concept and Technology Development phase
studies concepts, defines alternative concepts and provides
information about capability and risk of the potential
weapon system to be developed.  Before the SD&D phase
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begins, a decision review determines whether further
technology development is required, or whether the system
is ready to enter into systems acquisition.  The result of
this review will determine if the program meets the three
critical entrance criteria for the SD&D phase:  technology
maturity, validated requirements, and funding.
DoDI 5000.2 states, “[u]nless some other factor
is overriding in its impact, the maturity of the technology
will determine the path to be followed (DoDI 5000.2,
2001).”  Therefore, of these three entrance criteria,
technology will be the biggest determining factor as to
where the program enters this phase.  The program’s
technology maturity, either developed within DoD
laboratories and research centers or procured from
industry, is assessed by a demonstration within the
relevant or operational environment the systems is to be
operating in.  A successful demonstration means the
technology is mature enough to use for product development
in systems integration.
If technology is not mature, the program will be
allowed to proceed provided a mature, alternative
technology can meet the user’s needs (DoDI 5000.2, 2001). 
The Service Component Science and Technology (S&T)
Executive determines technology maturity.  However, the
DUSD(S&T) reviews the service component’s decision for
major acquisition programs, and if he/she does not concur
with the determination, the DUSD(S&T) will direct an
independent assessment before the program enters this
phase.
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The second critical entrance criterion is
validated requirements in the Operational Requirements
Document.  The ORD contains operational performance
requirements and addresses the program’s future costs.  The
requirements authority, prior to program approval, must
validate the ORD (DoDI 5000.2, 2001).  For major program
acquisitions, the requirements authority is the Vice-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, filling the role as
Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
The third of the three critical entrance criteria
is funding.  The DoDI 5000.2 states that the determination
on whether or not the program is affordable “is made in the
process of addressing cost as a military requirement in the
requirements process and included in each ORD, beginning
with the acquisition cost but using life-cycle cost or
total ownership cost where available and approved (DoDI
5000.2, 2001).”  Entry into the SD&D phase requires full
funding after the system concept and the program’s design
has been selected.  Furthermore, it is at this point that
the program manager is assigned. 

c. Milestone B
Milestone B is normally the official beginning or
initiation of an acquisition program.  Whether or not a
program is initiated depends on the three critical entrance
criteria previously mentioned.  The MDA confirms that
technology maturity, valid requirements, and funding have
been established before the program initiation decision is
made.  “On rare occasions, program initiation may be
appropriate earlier than Milestone B.  If so, program
  24
initiation will take place upon entry into, or during,
Component Advanced Development (IDAM, 2001, p. 58).”  The
purpose of the Milestone B decision is to authorize entry
into the SD&D phase and there will only be one Milestone B
decision per program.

d. Systems Integration 
As Figure 2 shows, the Systems Integration stage
has two main purposes.  These are systems integration of
demonstrated subsystems and components and the reduction of
integration risk.  For a new system not previously
developed, this stage will continue to build on the work
begun in the Concept and Technology Development phase, but
focus of effort shifts towards engineering development,
rather than the research-oriented efforts (Systems
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 17).
A weapons system program enters this stage when
“a system architecture exists, but the component subsystems
have not yet been integrated into a complete system (IDAM,
2001, p. 59).”  The focus is on integrating the subsystem
components so that the system prototype can be tested in a
relevant environment.  The integration risks that need to
be reduced are the “misunderstandings and errors regarding
system-level requirements [that] will flow down to
subsequent designs and [will] eventually result in overruns
and even program failure (Systems Engineering Fundamentals,
2001, p. 18).”  Therefore, a thorough requirements analysis
and review must be done to ensure that the user, the
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Figure 2. The System Development and
Demonstration Phase.  (From:  DoDI 5000.2, 2001)

The System Integration stage is finished when the
integration of the system has been “demonstrated in a
relevant environment using prototypes (e.g., first fight,
interoperable data flow across systems), a system
configuration has been documented, the MDA determines a
factor other than technology justifies forward progress, or
the MDA decides to end this effort (DoDI 5000.2, 2001).” 
This stage is followed by an Interim Progress Review, which
will decide whether or not the program continues to the
System Development stage. 
e. Interim Progress Review
The Introduction To Defense Acquisition
Management describes the purpose of the Interim Progress
Review as a confirmation “that the program is progressing
as planned within the System Development and Demonstration
phase or to adjust the program plan to better accommodate
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progress to date or change circumstances (IDAM, 2001, p.
59).”  The Milestone Decision Authority must approve
adjustments to the acquisition strategy.  There is no
established agenda during this review because it is
designed to be flexible so that the information
specifically requested by the MDA is provided. 

f. System Demonstration
The Systems Demonstration stage has two main
purposes:  complete development and demonstrate engineering
development models.  It is during this phase that the
engineering models are demonstrated to show they can
function consistently in accordance with the requirements
in the ORD.  These engineering prototypes are not
production representative systems instead, “they are system
demonstration models, or integrated commercial items, that
serve the purpose of enabling the developer to accomplish
development testing on the integrated system (Systems
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001, p. 18).”  Critical system
elements, like flight controls and avionics subsystems for
an aircraft, may be tested separately to show that the
subsystem integration is complete and to accomplish the
developmental testing.
The System Demonstration stage and System
Development and Demonstration phase ends when “a system is
demonstrated in its intended environment, using engineering
development models or integrated commercial items; meets
validated requirements; industrial capabilities are
reasonably available; and the system meets or exceeds exit
criteria and Milestone C entrance requirements (DoDI
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5000.2, 2001).”  The MDA decides to continue with the
program at Milestone C or decides that the program should
be discontinued.  Conclusion of the SD&D phase means the
system is ready to begin its low-rate initial production.

D. HOW LONG DOES WEAPON SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY LAST?
It is important to define how long different types of
weapon system technology last before an analysis of
President Bush’s proposal can be made.  To do this, a
sampling of a few weapon systems from ships, aircraft,
ground combat vehicles, artillery and other categories was
used to get a rough idea.  All the information was gathered
using the Internet search engine periscope.ucg.com under
the weapons/systems/platforms category unless otherwise
noted in Appendix B.  Appendix B gives a breakdown of each
type of weapon system category and brief remarks.  The
averages do not represent the exact weapon system’s




Twenty-two different types of ships from four
different categories were analyzed including:  Aircraft
Carrier, Amphibious, Frigate/Cruiser/Destroyer, and
Submarine.  The commissioning date of the first ship in
class was used to define the beginning for the class’
service life period as opposed to the service life of a
single platform.  Likewise, the decommissioning date of the
last ship defines the ending for the service life period of
the class.  The three classes of Aircraft Carriers analyzed
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had an average of 50.0 years of service.  In the Amphibious
category, three classes were also analyzed with an average
of 38.7 years of service.  In the Frigate/Cruiser/Destroyer
category, nine ships - two frigates, four cruisers, and
three destroyers - had an average service life of 29.3
years.  Finally, seven submarine classes were analyzed and
determined to have an average of 28 years of service.  The
combination of all 22 different ship classes had an average
36.5 years of DoD service.

2. Aircraft
Twenty different types of aircraft were analyzed from
three different classes which include:  Attack/Fighter,
Large Fixed Wing and Helicopter.  The Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) date was use to define the weapon system’s
beginning and the retirement date or projected retirement
date was used to define the ending.  An aircraft type
within the class may have been upgraded several times and
may not reflect the original aircraft.  However, this
analysis does not distinguish between the upgrades to
determine a new generation.  Rather, the entire life span
of the aircraft designation is considered one generation. 
For example, the AH-1G introduced in 1967 for the Marine
Corps is much different in looks, equipment and
capabilities than the AH-1Z that will be introduced in
2005.  The entire life span of the AH-1 is considered one
generation.  This method was used consistently for the
other weapon system categories.
The eight Attack/Fighter aircraft analyzed had an
average of 29.5 years of service.  The Large Fixed Wing
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aircraft - which include a bomber, five cargo/transports
and an anti-submarine aircraft - have an average of 58.9
years of service.  Finally, the five helicopters analyzed
have an average of 56.4 years of service.  The types of
aircraft chosen are used by the Army, Navy, Air Force and
Marine Corps and have a combined average of 48.3 years of
DoD service.  

3. Ground Combat Vehicles 
A sample of eight different ground combat vehicles
from air defense, armored personnel carrier, amphibious
assault vehicle, and tank classes were used.  Similar to
the aircraft previously described, the IOC date was used to
define the weapon system’s beginning and the retirement
date, or the projected retirement date was used to define
the ending.  The eight vehicles had an average of 36 years
of service.  The M163 Vulcan; Light Armored Vehicle-150
Commando Series (4x4); M113 Armored Personnel Carrier;
Amphibious Assault Vehicle-7; Landing Vehicle, Tracked,
Personnel-5; M88 Armored Recovery Vehicle; the M1 Abrams
tank; and the M60 Patton tank were the vehicles chosen.

4. Artillery
Four artillery pieces, one a towed version and three
self-propelled versions, were analyzed.  The IOC date and
the retirement date were used to define the technology
length.  The average service life of these four pieces came





Eight other weapon systems round out the analysis. 
This final section is made up of one anti-tank, two anti-
radar, three anti-air missiles and two torpedoes.  The
length of technology for these projectiles was defined as
beginning at IOC and ending with the retirement date.  The
retirement dates of the AGM-114 Hellfire, which is
scheduled for upgrade, and the AIM-7 Sparrow, for which
production ended in the 1990s, were estimated since no
information was available. These two projectiles are still
used on several platforms.  The eight projectiles had an
average service life of 38.5 years.  

E. PRESIDENT BUSH’S PROPOSAL TO SKIP A GENERATION OF
TECHNOLOGY
President George W. Bush’s “skip a generation of
technology” proposal focuses on transforming and reforming
the DoD acquisition process.  In his own words, Bush said
of his proposal, “We will modernize some existing weapons
and equipment, necessary for current tasks…to move beyond
marginal improvements to replace existing programs with new
technologies and strategies — to use this window of
opportunity to skip a generation of technology (Hellman,
2000).”  The four main areas of this proposal are
increasing the pace of weapons system development;
investing in newer, future technologies while modernizing
existing equipment; transforming DoD to the changing threat
and shrinking Defense budget; and skipping weapon systems




1. Increasing the Pace of Weapon System Development
In order for the DoD to meet the emerging threats of
the Twenty-first century, it must be able to develop weapon
systems more quickly.  DoD’s acquisition process “has
become slower, while the pace of technological change has
become far more rapid” creating “a situation where it is
difficult for the acquisition process to produce anything
other than capabilities that are already a generation
behind when deployed (Mann, 2001).”  This goes to the heart
of the proposal, which is determined to decrease the time
it takes to get new weapon systems fielded.
One reason the procurement process is taking too long
is that the bureaucratic and political regulation of the
acquisition life cycle process has become overly
burdensome.  Gordon Adams, director of the security policy
studies program for the Elliott School of International
Affairs at George Washington University said the failure of
the acquisition process to produce timely weapon systems is
a “combination of bureaucratic rigidities in the
acquisition system, an excess of bureaucratic intervention
in the process of [weapons] development and partially
budgetary limitations (Mann, 2001).”  This bureaucracy has
caused the nine-year acquisition process for major weapon
system programs to draw out 15 to 20 years (Mann, 2001).

2. Investing In Newer, Future Technologies While
Modernizing Existing Equipment
The second key part of the proposal is to invest in
newer, future technologies while modernizing existing
equipment.  Modernizing existing weapon systems and
equipment will facilitate skipping current weapon systems
  32
in development and allow future technologies to be
developed and fielded.  President Bush said to an audience
in Norfolk, Virginia that, “We will modernize some existing
weapons and equipment, a task we have neglected for too
long…[b]ut we will do this judiciously and selectively. 
Our goal is to move beyond marginal improvements to harness
new technologies that will support a new strategy (Ruddy,
2001).”
In order to acquire weapon systems with the latest
technology, President Bush has proposed significant
increases in the RDT&E budget.  The RDT&E budget fell from
the Reagan Buildup Era high of $51.375 billion (constant FY
2003) in 1987 to a low of $39.024 billion (FY 2003) in 1995
(FY 2003 Defense Budget 2003, pp. 113, 114).  DoD’s budget
has RDT&E increasing steadily over the next few years to
$58.429 billion (FY 2003) in 2005 (FY 2003 Defense Budget
2003, p. 115).  Furthermore, Bush proposes spending 20% of
the annual procurement budget (roughly $13 billion) on
advanced technology programs (Hellman, 2000).  Weapon
systems with newer technology will be characterized “not by
mass or size but by mobility and swiftness (Hartung,
2002),” in order to meet the requirements of the new
battlefield.

3. Transforming DoD to the Changing Threat and
Shrinking Defense Budget
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Federal Government decreased spending on national defense. 
Likewise, the threat environment to the United States has
changed in location, scale and form.  Therefore, the third
main purpose of the proposal is to transform DoD to meet
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the changing threat environment with a reduced amount of
national resources devoted to defense.  
DoD’s share of the Federal budget went from 27.3% of
federal outlays in 1987 to 15.9% in 2002 and its percentage
of gross domestic product has decreased from near 5.9% to
less than 3.2% during the same period (FY 2003 Defense
Budget 2003, p. 217).  Though DoD’s Federal budget share
increases 1% in 2003, senior Pentagon leadership realizes
that DoD cannot balance its budget and keep all the weapon
systems in procurement.  The Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, acknowledged, “the Pentagon cannot pay for all of
the programs now on the books (Shanker and Doa, 2002),” and
has proposed billions of dollars in weapons cuts.
Meanwhile, as the budget continues to shrink relative
to the needs, the threat environment is changing.  Some
experts argue that today’s military is not suited for
dealing with tomorrow’s defense challenges.  New missions
such as defeating anti-access/area-denial threats,
controlling space and homeland defense requires major
changes in U.S. military doctrine, force structures,
capabilities, and investment patterns, and consequently a
more flexible, relevant acquisition process (Krepinevich,
2001).

4. Skipping Weapon Systems Currently In Development
that Are No Longer Relevant
The fourth area of President Bush’s proposal is to
skip weapon systems currently in development, designed to
fight in the Cold War Era, which are no longer relevant. 
During one of his speeches, the President stressed “the
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need to move beyond a military force ‘organized for Cold
War threats’ in which there is ‘almost no relationship
between our budget priorities and a strategic vision
(Hartung, 2002).’”  Continuing the President’s call for
military transformation, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld “vowed
to cancel obsolete systems, cut entrenched force structure,
and forge a quicker, smarter, more mobile force to meet the
threats of the future (Borosage, 2002).”  
Weapon systems currently under development that may be
skipped span all DoD Services as the focus shifts “away
from Cold War remnants of heavy artillery and aircraft
carries (Daniel, 2001).”  These systems include the F-22
Tactical Fighter Aircraft, the F-18E/F Fighter Aircraft,
the V-22 Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft, the Comanche Scout
Light Attack Helicopter and the Virginia-Class Submarine. 
The Crusader Mobile Artillery Piece and the DD-21 Destroyer
programs are restructuring due to recent DoD actions. 
These weapon systems will be described in greater detail in
the sections that follow.

a. F-22 Tactical Fighter Aircraft
The F-22 Raptor Advanced Tactical Fighter
aircraft, produced by Lockheed Martin Corporation, is the
future air superiority fighter for the U.S. Air Force. 
Designed to be stealthy, the F-22 is the most advanced
aerial combat plane ever produced.  “The aircraft was
originally designed during the Cold War to counter a
sophisticated future threat from Soviet fighter planes that
never came to fruition (Eland, 2001),” and the price of
$180 million per copy makes it the most expensive.  The
  35
Raptor began the acquisition process in 1983 when a concept
definition study award was issued to six aerospace
contractors.  Despite nearly two decades in the acquisition
pipeline, the program is only now undergoing LRIP
(Jane’s/F-22, 2002).
Critics argue that the F-22 is a prime candidate
to be skipped because the United States has established air
superiority with aircraft currently in its inventory. 
Moreover, on May 10, 2002 senior Pentagon officials
“ordered the Air Force to study several alternatives that
could replace existing plans to buy 295 F-22 Raptors” and
“look at specific options involving fewer aircraft, as well
as alternatives for accomplishing the air-superiority
mission in other ways (Crawley and Maze, 2002).”  The Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) may be a suitable substitute and can
be produced more cost effectively by the Air Force than the
F-22.

b. F-18E/F Fighter Aircraft
The F-18E/F Super Hornet is an upgraded version
of F-18C/D tactical aircraft carrier based fighter for the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.  The E/F variant is designed to
overcome the limited range of the C/D and incorporate the
latest in aerospace technology.  The Boeing Company is the
prime contractor and the program is currently in full rate
production at a cost of about $59 million per aircraft
(Jane’s/F-18E/F, 2002).
The F-18E/F is a good candidate because President
Bush has expressed skepticism about buying three new
tactical fighters in the past.  He believes that the
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country cannot afford to field the F-22, F-18E/F and the
JSF, which combined, will cost $380 billion.  He said we
should “’pick the best one, and the one that fits into our
strategy (Eland, 2001).’”  One of the program’s biggest
critics has been the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 
GAO has criticized its program management and has been
skeptical about whether its “design represents a sufficient
improvement in capability to be worth the cost of procuring
(Periscope/F/A-18E/F, 1999).”  Savings from the F-22 and F-
18E/F program could be used to fund other DoD priorities.

c. V-22 Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft
The V-22 weapon system is a multi-engine; dual-
piloted, self-deployable, medium lift, vertical takeoff and
landing aircraft that will perform future U.S. Marine
Corps, U.S. Navy and U.S. Special Operations Command combat
missions (Whitworth, 1996, p. 23).  Developed by both Bell
Helicopter Textron and Boeing, the V-22 combines the
agility of a helicopter and the speed and extended range of
an airplane.  Operating like a helicopter for takeoffs and
landings, the V-22, once airborne, converts to a turboprop
aircraft capable of carrying up to twenty-four combat-
equipped soldiers for 2,100 nautical miles after a single
in-air refueling (Inspector General Report, 2000, p. 1). 
The V-22 is intended to replace the Marine Corps aging CH-
46E and CH-53D fleet and become its main assault aircraft. 
Each Marine Corps version per unit cost is $57 million in
FY2000 dollars.  The program is currently in the system
demonstration stage after two crashes have delayed sending
the program to production (Jane’s/V-22, 2002).
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What make the V-22 a prime candidate to be
skipped are its poor safety, reliability and
maintainability record and its high cost.  Several times as
costly as other substitute helicopters, the program “has
already cost $15 billion more than was initially estimated
and is 10 years behind schedule (Eland, 2001).”  In April
1989, then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney - who
ironically is now the Vice President - canceled the V-22
program citing a lack of affordability although Congress
overturned that decision.  Therefore, critics argue that
the V-22 will likely be skipped and the program’s funding
diverted to acquire cheaper CH-53 or H-60 helicopters. 

d. Comanche Scout Light Attack Helicopter
The Army’s RAH-66 Comanche helicopter is the
first combat helicopter designed from the outset to have
“stealth” features and target acquisition features
(Jane’s/RAH-66, 2001).  At a cost of about $33 million
each, the Comanche was originally designed “to hunt Soviet
tanks on the central plains of Europe (Eland, 2001),” a
mission that is out-of-date.  Like the F-22 and the V-22,
the Comanche has had its trouble in the acquisition
pipeline.  Currently the program is in the system
demonstration stage and is expected to go to LRIP in
October 2004 (Jane’s/RAH-66, 2001).
As the mission statement for the Comanche is
rewritten and the Army undergoes its transformation,
cancellation of the Comanche may be necessary to free up
funding.  “As late as April of 1998, the U.S. Army’s RAH-66
Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter program was on
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track, but defense officials stated that the program faced
an equal chance of either being accelerated or never
reaching production (Periscope/RAH-66, 2000).”  A light
attack version of the OH-58 Kiowa helicopter might be a
less expensive Army alternative if the program is skipped.

e. Crusader Mobile Artillery Piece
The Crusader is an advanced field artillery
system with a self-propelled 155 mm howitzer currently in
the system demonstration stage.  United Defense is
developing the Crusader to replace the Army’s current M109-
series Paladin 155 mm self-propelled howitzer, whose basic
design is over 40 years old (Jane’s/Crusader, 2002).  Each
Crusader costs about $23 million per weapon system (Eland,
2001).
The Army is currently undergoing a transformation
that is supposed to make it lighter.  That is why the
“fully loaded system [that] could still weigh 80 tons (with
its supply vehicle) (Eland, 2001)” makes a good candidate
to be skipped.  If fact, on May 8, 2002, Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld announced his decision to ask Congress to
terminate funding for the Crusader, a system which he feels
the Army and DoD cannot afford (Crawley and Maze, 2002). 
Other options for the Crusader include investing in R&D for
a lighter mobile artillery piece and upgrading the existing







The DD-21, now called the DD(X) program, is a
future destroyer that is being developed to attack land
targets.  The DD-21 was supposed to have 120 vertical
launch system cells to launch land attack missiles and two
155 mm guns to fire guided rocket-assisted shells.  The new
DD(X) will likely have the same capabilities but will have
a “common hull form and technology development
(Jane’s/DD(X), 2001)” that will be used in combination with
the future cruisers (CG(X)).  Now that the program has been
renamed DD(X), a new request for proposal has been issued,
starting the Concept and Technology Development phase over. 
The DD-21 ships were going to cost $780 million each and
future destroyer prices are likely to be higher (Eland,
2001).
Like the other programs on this list, cost is the
main reason the DD(X) program may get skipped.  One of 70
major DoD programs experiencing cost increases, the DD(X)
program’s cost “rose from $5.2 billion to $10.8 billion, a
107 percent increase (Lowe and Brown, 2002).”  In 2001, the
House Appropriations Committee slashed the DD-21 budget by
75 percent and in 2000 DoD directed the Navy to slide its
production schedule to accommodate the rising research and
development cost estimates (Periscope/DD(X), 2002). 
Alternatives for the Navy include continuing to build and
upgrade the existing DDG-51 destroyers.

g. Virginia-Class Submarine
Lastly, the Virginia-class submarine is the
Navy’s “New nuclear-powered Attack Submarine (NSSN).”  The
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program is a joint venture and is being developed by
General Dynamics, Electric Boat Division and Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company at $2.2 billion each.  A
total of 30 Virginia-class submarines are scheduled to be
produced at a rate of one ship per year (Eland, 2001).  The
new submarines will allow the Navy more flexibility and be
capable of operating near the shore as part of the Navy’s
“From the Sea” strategy (Periscope/Virginia (SSN-774)
class, 2002).  After the fall of the Soviet Union, the need
for large nuclear submarines has diminished prompting the
Navy to adopt the Virginia Class platform over the larger,
more capable Seawolf class. 
Critics argue that production on the Virginia-
Class Submarine can be terminated because the U.S. has
subsurface superiority in its existing submarine fleet. 
“Even if Russia does build a few new boats and even if the
Virginia-class is truncated, the United States will have
the best submarine fleet in the world for the foreseeable
future” and, “the three Seawolf-class submarines, the few
Virginia-class boats already funded, and numerous 6881 Los
Angeles-class ships cannot be matched by any nation,
including Russia (Eland, 2001).”  The GAO reported in 1998
that “an improved threat and cost-based reductions in
certain systems’ performance may mean that the nuclear subs
are not as capable as needed” noting that “funding cuts
within the program have reduced capabilities
(Periscope/Virginia (SSN-774) class, 2002).”  Therefore,
President Bush may choose to cancel this program and shift
its funding to other priorities like spy satellites,
unmanned and manned reconnaissance aircraft and National
Missile Defense.
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F. OPPOSITION TO THE “SKIP A GENERATION” PROPOSAL
Not everyone agrees with the “skip a generation of
technology” proposal.  Dr. Jim Richardson, vice president
for research at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies,
thinks the proposal is “flawed in its absolutism” and
cautions the Administration to take “a reasonable approach
to things and replace technology where it needs to be
replaced (Ruddy, 2001).”  The biggest opposition is likely
to come, however, from Congress, the DoD Services, and
contractors who are desperately trying to protect their
programs and justify their necessity.  They stress the
potential negative impact that skipping weapon systems will
have on DoD readiness.  DoD is already saddled with aging
systems and increasing operating costs.

1. Tough Sell to Congress and the Services
A challenge for the proposal will be to get both sides
of ideological lines to agree to weapons cuts.  Loeb and
Graham agree, stating that the “inability to please either
camp despite a proposed $48 billion increase in military
spending highlights the Pentagon’s continuing difficulty in
cutting impractical big-ticket programs (Loeb and Graham,
2002).”  This stalemate makes any attempt at skipping a
weapon platform a difficult task.  Likewise, Congressmen
within districts that will be affected by cuts, services
badly needing replacement systems, and the contractors “are
expected to put up fierce resistance in the months before
writing the 2004 budget and appropriating the funds
(Shanker and Dao, 2002)”.
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A good illustration of a Congressional fight over
canceling a weapon system is the V-22 Osprey.  The V-22
Osprey, which has been in development since it was a U.S.
Army program in 1982, has yet to reach full rate production
(Jane’s/V-22, 2002).  The aircraft is slated as the
replacement for the Marine Corps’ “aging fleet of slower
and louder Vietnam-era [CH-46E and CH-53D] helicopters
(Associated Press, 2002)”.  Both the CH-46E and the CH-53D
are beyond their intended service life.  Despite the V-22’s
development problems, both the Marine Corps and Congress
have continued to support the aircraft.  One supporter in
Congress includes Representative Curt Weldon (Republican,
Pennsylvania), the chairman of the House Armed Service
Research and Development Subcommittee, who has “launched an
aggressive campaign to keep the Osprey program alive
(Kitfield, 2001).”  Boeing Helicopters, co-developer of the
Osprey, is located in Pennsylvania. 

2. Aging Equipment and Increasing Operating Costs
The effects of aging equipment and a decreasing
defense budget early in the 1990’s weren’t at first
apparent because much of the Reagan Buildup Era equipment
was still fairly new and the cost to operate and maintain
such equipment was low.  But, as the decreasing-funding
trend continued, DoD was forced to shift procurement
funding to operations and sustainment (O&S) pay to maintain
these systems.  “Critics argue that tight budgets in the
1990s have led the [Clinton] Administration to cut weapons
modernization too deeply to protect near-term readiness. 
Low rates of modernization, they contend, will jeopardize
the ‘future readiness’ of the force, which depends on
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modern weaponry (Tryszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998).”  The
modernization cuts forced DoD to put off future procurement
investments to pay to maintain the current systems.  This
downward cycle of robbing from the future has compounded
the aging systems problem.  Figure 3 illustrates this
cycle.
These same critics point to aging weapon systems and
the downward “death spiral” as the biggest reason DoD
cannot afford to skip current weapon systems in
development.  “Industry officials argue that the Pentagon
needs to buy weapons like the F-22 because existing
equipment is rapidly wearing out, making it expensive to
maintain.  Waiting for new technologies to become available
will cost the Pentagon more money in spare parts and
maintenance (Shanker and Dao, 2002).”  The F-22, like other
major programs, has been in the acquisition cycle for 20
years and, skipping the F-22 means stretching current









This chapter first described the Department of Defense
acquisition life cycle process and its four phases.  DoD
uses the acquisition life cycle process to develop and
field new weapon systems.  The process focuses on
performance and results-based management to ensure the
acquisition of efficient and effective weapon systems.  The
life cycle process helps focus acquisition managers on
translating operational needs into stable, affordable
programs, acquiring quality products, and organizing for
efficiency and effectiveness.
Second, how DoD assesses when weapon system technology
is mature and how it develops the technology into a weapon
system were discussed.  The Milestone Decision Authority
determines when potential weapon systems technologies are
sufficiently mature during the Concept and Technology
Development phase using a technology readiness level to
assess each critical technology in development.  The System
Development and Demonstration phase integrates the
technology into a prototype that is used to determine if
the weapon system is ready for production.
Finally, the life spans for different types of weapon
systems technology were defined.  After defining a
generation of technology, the President’s proposal to skip
a generation of technology was discussed.  The four main
areas of his proposal are increasing the pace of weapon
system development; investing in newer, future technologies
while modernizing existing equipment; transforming DoD to
the changing threat and shrinking federal budget; and
skipping weapon systems currently in development that are
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no longer relevant.  Next, five possible weapon systems
that may be skipped and two that are restructuring were
discussed.  The chapter concluded with arguments for why
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III.RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins by discussing why the research
questions were selected and provides insight into the role
of new technology in the Department of Defense (DoD), the
importance of the defense industry to national security,
and how new technology and the defense industry relate to
each other.  Next, the data collection interview
methodology is discussed and the data collection technique
and interview questions are presented.  Initial research
included a thorough literary review of books, magazine and
newspaper articles, Internet resources and other library
information resources relating to the DoD acquisition life
cycle process and President Bush’s “skip a generation of
technology” proposal.  Follow-on research consisted of e-
mail interviews.  Interviews were conducted with a wide
variety of DoD acquisition professionals.

B. OBJECTIVE
As it is apparent from Chapter II, while in theory it
may be possible to skip weapon systems in development, the
effects on acquisition management and the defense industry
are uncertain.  Both the defense industry and the
Government make large investments of time, money, and
resources when developing new technology for a weapon
system.  The documents that govern the acquisition process
guide acquisition managers.  Strict adherence to these
guidelines is key to successful development of a weapon
system.  On the other hand, defense contractors’
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investments in the technology and the weapon system often
aren’t recouped until after the system undergoes
production.  It is these expected returns of investments
that keep the defense industry going.  
Cancellation of a weapon system can be devastating to
that company and ultimately that sector of the defense
industry.  For Example, in the mid 1990s Ratheon Company
began acquiring military-electronics firms.  These
electronic firms could not convert their businesses to
commercial applications after their defense programs were
canceled.  A report by the Defense Budget Project stated,
“The cancellation or culmination of several existing or
projected major-weapon systems has had, and will continue
to exert, a profound effect on the defense industrial base
(Coolidge, 1995).”  Aggressive job cuts, plant closings,
and these types of mergers were the result of the
cancellations.  Therefore, realizing the importance of the
acquisition process and the defense industry to the
development of new weapon systems, the objective of this
thesis is to answer the following two primary research
questions:
• In systems acquisition management, is it
realistic to skip a generation of weapon system
technology?
• How will the Department of Defense and the
defense industrial base be impacted if weapon
systems currently in development are skipped? 
Prior to conducting research for this thesis, the
initial objective was to compare and contrast the opinions
of DoD acquisition professionals with those of defense
contractors regarding the President’s proposal. 
Unfortunately all of the defense contractors that were
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contacted by the author declined to be interviewed. 
Therefore, the decision was made to restrict the focus of
research to DoD acquisition professionals only.  
The paragraphs that follow will focus specifically on
the roles of new technology in DoD, the current state of
the defense industry and the relationship of the defense
industry to the Department of Defense.

1. The Role of New Technology in DoD
In 2000, the Pentagon released its future joint
warfighting plan, Joint Vision 2020.  Joint Vision 2020
highlights the role technology will play in future DoD
forces as it is heavily focused on “the increasingly
important role of command, control, communication,
computers and intelligence (C4I) technologies in joint and
coalition operations (Phillips Business Information
Corporation, 2000).”  Therefore, new technology will play
and increasingly important role in current weapon systems
and in the acquisition of new weapon systems.  “[T]he Joint
Vision 2020 report notes that not only must technology be
embraced, but upgrading the procedures for integrating
those technologies should also be a key focus for future
acquisition authorities (Phillips Business Information
Corporation, 2000).”
One DoD challenge to incorporating new technology into
new and existing weapon systems is to overcome the funding
deficiencies that have plagued the department throughout
the 1990s.  As its equipment continues to age and
operational costs increase, developing and exploiting new
technology is becoming increasingly more difficult.  “As
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the military works to transform itself into units that lend
themselves to expeditionary operations, Congress and a
number of uniformed leaders have said that there remains a
gap between the level of funding allocated to current
capabilities and base infrastructure and that provided for
the development of new technologies (Keeter, 2001).”  
Some critics argue that DoD’s inability to capitalize
on existing and future technologies and the outdated
equipment it is using now are reasons why DoD cannot afford
to skip over the systems in development.  One defense
official said “in some cases you get systems aging to the
point where it’s necessary to replace them with what you’ve
got (Freedberg Jr., 2000),” and that failing to do so will
put DoD even further behind in modernizing its forces.
Senior DoD officials and its supporters in Congress
contend that new technology and weapon systems are crucial
to keeping America’s forces number one in the world. 
Perhaps Representative Curt Weldon (Republican,
Pennsylvania) put it best when he said, “the development of
new systems and technologies to suit tomorrow’s battlefield
requirements is also key to keeping the military on the
cutting edge of combat capability (Keeter, 2001).”

2. The Current State of the U.S. Defense Industry
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. defense industry
has experienced its biggest boom since the 1980s.  “U.S.
arms procurement and research and development (R&D) budgets
in 2002 have jumped to $109 billion, a 5.4% increase from
the previous year, which in turn has boosted Wall Street’s
valuation of defense companies’ share prices and market
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capitalization to robust levels (Jane’s/US Defence
Industry, 2002).”  However, the defense industry is still
trying to recover from the 1990s, a decade with the lowest
percentage of gross domestic product spending on defense
since World War II.
With the fall of the Soviet Union and at the end of
the Cold War, deep cuts in defense spending have been the
trend throughout the 1990s.  As Mary Tryszkiewicz and
Stephan Daggett indicate, “when the ‘ups and downs’ are
smoothed out,” our national defense budget authority
declined in real terms “by about 3.4 percent per year from
FY 1985 to FY 1998” and, “total budget authority for
national defense declined by 36% in real terms between the
peak of the Reagan Buildup Era in FY1985 and FY1998, while
weapons procurement declined by 67% and O&S by just 17%
over the same period (Tryszkiewicz and Daggett, 1998).” 
The decline in overall defense funding, combined with
the increased operational tempo during the decade, forced
DoD to divert future weapon system procurements to pay for
rising operations and sustainment (O&S) costs on existing
equipment.  This shift from procurement to O&S (termed
‘procurement holiday’) and “with the defense industry just
recovering from dramatic post-Cold War cuts in spending”
Defense officials argue the industry “cannot afford another
‘procurement holiday (Freedberg Jr., 2000).’”
The 1990s forced a lot of companies out of the defense
market, as stock prices and new procurement projects
declined.  Robert Friedman, an aerospace and defense
analyst with Standard & Poor’s Equity Group, said “defense
stocks made a quick downturn early in the Clinton
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Administration after [former President] Clinton invited
industry executives to Washington and [Clinton] said
‘there’s not enough business after the Cold War for all of
you (Daniel, 2001).’”  Even Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
acknowledged the “three top defense contractors in size,
Boeing and Raytheon and Lockheed [Martin], had a market
cap[italization] that was less than Wal-Mart...[b]ecause
doing business with the government is not a great deal
(Mann, 2001).”
Today, defense contractors are large conglomerates
that have merged from smaller companies in order to take
advantage of economies of scale.  These mergers were, in
most cases, necessary for their survival.  “Over the past
decade, virtually every tier of the industry from major
prime contractors to suppliers have consolidated through a
series of deals that have lead to a far fewer number of
larger and more vertically integrated companies (Muradian
and Wolfe, 2001).”  This consolidation is troubling to some
because less competition means less innovation and
opportunities to develop and exploit new technologies. 
Regardless, Pete Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) views improving
the strength of the defense industrial base as a priority
for DoD.  When asked what his priorities were, he said,
“Improving the health of the nation’s defense industrial





3. New Technology and the Defense Industry:  DoD’s
Lifeline
From the above paragraphs, it should be apparent that
new technology and the defense industry are extremely
important to DoD’s ability to fight and win wars.  The
Defense Department relies on industry to develop weapon
systems that incorporate the latest technology so that its
forces will remain superior throughout the world.  These
weapon systems are used to protect our national security
and implement our national military objectives.  
Under Secretary Aldridge said, “The health of the
defense industrial base is extremely important to national
security and we have to make sure the industry gets the
proper support (Muradian and Wolfe, 2001).”  Therefore, to
maintain national security, the United States must ensure
that the defense industry remains an attractive business to
make a profit and support shareholders goals.  Aldridge
acknowledges this saying, “We have to make sure that we
recognize that in the government and that the government’s
objective in turn is to get the absolute highest quality
weapon systems.  For that to happen, the industry has to
stay a viable business where government and corporate
objectives coincide (Muradian and Wolfe, 2001).”  It is for
these reasons that the decision was made to focus on how
DoD and the defense industrial base would be impacted if
current weapon systems in development are skipped and if it






Chapter II has already answered the subsidiary
research questions:  
• What does “skip a generation of technology” mean?
• How does the Department of Defense develop new
technology into a weapon system?
• How does DoD determine when technology is mature?
• How long is a generation of weapon system
technology?
The answers to these questions were obtained through
the initial research, which included a thorough review of
available literature:  books, magazine and newspaper
articles, Defense acquisition documents, Internet
resources, and other library information resources relating
to the DoD acquisition process and the “skip a generation
of technology” proposal.  A thorough search of DoD’s
current weapon systems inventory was done using the
Internet and in order to compare how long different types
of weapon systems technology lasts.  
Interviews were conducted to answer the primary
research questions listed below:
• In systems acquisition management, is it
realistic to skip a generation of weapon system
technology?
• How will the Department of Defense and the
defense industrial base be impacted if weapon
systems currently in development are skipped? 
Contact was made with a variety of acquisition
professionals within the Department of Defense.  A total of
eleven DoD employees were interviewed.  The demographics of
this group were as follows:
• Eight were active duty military
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• Three were Government civilian personnel
Initially potential interviewees were contacted in
person during their visits to the Naval Postgraduate School
describing the nature of the research and requesting either
an e-mail or telephone interview.  Other potential
interviewees were contacted through e-mail.  A list of the
interview questions was included in an e-mail to those that
agreed to participate in the study.  The questions were
designed to focus on the impact that skipping weapon
systems in development would have on DoD and the defense
industrial base.  The interviewees were informed that,
because of the number of interviews being conducted, an e-
mail interview was preferred.  If this was not suitable, a
telephone interview could be conducted at the convenience
of the interviewee.  
Each interviewee was informed that all information
that they provided would be kept strictly confidential and
neither their organization, their program, nor their names
would be specifically identified.  Program specific
information was only asked for in order to help organize
the data and ensure that data were being obtained about a
number of different programs.  The goal was to avoid
obtaining duplicate data.  The participants were assured
that the findings would be presented as a group and would
not identify or target any specific program.  This was done
so that the participants could answer all question honestly
without any fear of possible reprisal or repercussions. 
The confidential information requested, and used for














The following interview questions were used for each





1. On a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being very important,
how important do you think defense contracts are to your
Contractor? 

2. Is the program you are working on for the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marines or Coast Guard, and what is the
nature of your program (aircraft, ship, tank, artillery, or
vehicle)?

3. According to the DoD acquisition process, what
phase of development is your program in? 

4. How long has your weapon system been in
development and how much longer do you think it will take
before it is ready for Initial Operational Capability?
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5. In terms of the product you are developing, how
often does technology change to be classified as a “new
generation” of technology?

6. For a major weapon system, the acquisition
process takes a long time, while technological change is
becoming more rapid.  In your opinion, how can the
acquisition process be streamlined to keep pace with
technological innovations in order to field a weapon system
more quickly?

7. Once your system is fielded, how long is the
estimated service life of your weapon system before it is
scheduled to be replaced?

8. Are you aware of the Bush Administration’s
proposal to skip current weapon systems under development
in order to start research and development on newer




1. Is there any technology available now that is
newer or better than the technology that you are using in
developing your weapon system and can it be incorporated
into the system you are developing?
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2. If your program were to be canceled, how long do
you think it would take before a next generation system
could be developed and fielded?

3. What do you think the DoD can do, in the interim,
if your program were to be canceled in order to maintain
current readiness and capabilities (upgrade current
systems, leases, COTS systems until the next generation is
available, etc)? 

4. What do you feel the biggest impact, positive or
negative, cancellation of your program would have on the
Department of Defense?

5. Please add any additional comments regarding the
impact that skipping a generation of weapons technology
might have on the Department of Defense.  

Impact on Defense Industrial Base:

1. If your program were to be canceled, how do you
feel this would impact your Contractor’s decision to pursue
Government defense contracts in the future?
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2. Do you feel that your Contractor will be
competitive for bidding on the next generation weapon
system?
3. If your program were to be skipped, what are some
things that the Department of Defense and the U.S.
Government could do to keep your Contractor in the defense
industry?

4. If your program were to be canceled, do you think
your Contractor will reallocate the resources currently
used in development of your program (i.e. people,
equipment, manufacturing capacity, etc) towards other DoD
contracts or to other company interests? 

5. Please add any additional comments on the impact
that skipping a generation of weapons technology might have
on your Contractor and/or the defense industrial base you
are working in.  

Feasibility of Skipping a Generation of Technology:

1. Do you think it is feasible for DoD to “skip”
your program and still meet the current national threats
and the threats of the future?

2. Please feel free to add any additional comments
relating to the feasibility of skipping a generation of
technology regarding your program or in general.
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Once all the interviews were completed, the author
combined the responses onto a master interview response
sheet.  The purpose of the master interview response sheet
was to facilitate the sorting and analysis of the data. 

D. SUMMARY
This chapter initially discussed the reasoning as to
why the primary research question was selected.  The
primary research questions were once again presented:
• In systems acquisition management, is it
realistic to skip a generation of weapon system
technology?
• How will the Department of Defense and the
defense industrial base be impacted if weapon
systems currently in development are skipped? 

Initial research provided insight into the DoD
acquisition process and the “skip a generation of
technology” proposal.  DoD places great importance on the
acquisition process to develop and incorporate new
technology into a weapon system to maintain national
security and implement the nation’s National Military
Strategy.  
Next, the methodology of the study was discussed.  The
research participants, interview techniques of data
collection and demographics of the study were presented. 
Finally, the interview questions were themselves presented. 
Along with this, quick reference was made to the master
interview response sheet that was used to facilitate the
sorting and analysis of the accumulated data.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter contains a summary of interviews
conducted by the author during October 2002.  The purpose
of the interviews was to acquire the data necessary to
answer the primary research questions.
As presented in the previous chapter, the interview
questions were structured to focus on the impact that
skipping a generation of technology would have on the
Department of Defense (DoD) and the defense industrial base
as well as its feasibility.  The data represent comments,
opinions and personal experiences of those interviewed in
regards to the ten questions concerning the impact on DoD
and the defense industry and two questions regarding the
feasibility of the proposal.  The responses to each
question are grouped so that the data can be presented
together.  Beginning at section “C” of this chapter, the
questions are again presented in the sections that follow
and are followed by the compiled data and a short analysis.

B. PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR PROGRAMS
Eleven DoD acquisition professionals were interviewed. 
Eight were active duty military members the other three
were civilian Government personnel.  Of the eight military
members, five were program (or product) managers; one was a
test manager; one a special projects officer; and one was
in charge of the program’s systems engineering division. 
Of the three civilians, one was a test branch team leader;
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one was a team leader for multiple projects; and one was a
program manager.  
The eleven respondents were members of Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, joint and Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) programs.  These programs consisted of three aircraft
programs, three ground combat vehicle programs, one
artillery program, and four programs that would be
categorized as other.  On a scale of 1-10 (10 being very
important) eight of the eleven answered 10 to how important
defense contracts are to their contractor.  Two answered
nine and the other answered eight.  Two of the respondents
that answered 10, stated that they would rate their
subcontractors 7 or less.  
The programs span the entire DoD acquisition process. 
One program is in the Concept and Technology Development
phase, five are in System Development and Demonstration
phase, two are in Production and Deployment phase, two in
Sustainment and Disposal phase and the OSD program answered
not applicable.  Two of the respondents with multiple
programs also had programs in the Concept and Technology
Development phase.  Of the eight programs that have not yet
reached the Sustainment or Disposal phase (the last phase
of the acquisition process), three are aircraft programs,
two are vehicle programs, one is an artillery program and
two fill the other category.  
One of the programs is a ship’s self defense
protection system and has been in development for 26 years
with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date set for
2008.  Two of the aircraft programs have been in
development for 11 years with and IOC date of 2009, the
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other, eight years with an IOC date of 2012.  One of the
vehicle programs has been in development since 1988 with
and IOC date of 2008 and the other for two years with and
IOC date of 2010.  The artillery program began development
in 1998 and entered IOC this year.  Finally, the last
program takes four years from development to IOC.
The technology rate of change for these programs
ranged from every two years for the computer processing
components; to eight years for the vehicles; to ten or more
years for aircraft platforms.  However, the service life of
these programs ranged from 35 years for ship’s component,
30 years for aircraft, 30 years for vehicles, 25 years
artillery, and from five to 17 years for the other
programs.  These figures were fairly consistent with those
that the author found in Chapter II.  The respondents from
the aircraft programs did not come from large fixed wing
programs, which would explain the difference between the
author’s research and that of the respondents.
Knowing that it takes a long time to develop a weapon
systems, the author asked the interviewees their opinion on
how the acquisition process could be streamlined to
capitalize on technological innovations in order to field
systems more quickly.  The interviewees were not limited to
only one response.  Most had more than one suggestion and,
when totaled, they responded with 14 different suggestions. 
Table 1 lists the suggestions and the number of times the
different interviewees made the suggestion.  The most
common responses dealt with stabilizing the program’s
budget early in the System Development and Demonstration
phase, adjusting the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
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System (PPBS), and using open-architecture designs to allow
new technology to be incorporated during program
development.  

Suggestion  Number of Times
Suggested
Stabilize the program’s budget after
Milestone B
 Four
Adjust the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS)
 Three
Use open-architecture designs during
development
 Three
Combine developmental and operational
testing
 Two
Increase the amount of modeling and
simulation
 Two
Use performance based specifications  Two
Better use of off-the-self products  One
Use spiral development  One
Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WARP)  One
Reduce documentation  One
Design systems with middle software layer  One
Use plug and play hardware  One
Develop a service wide RDT&E money pool  One
Nothing  One

Table 1. Suggestions To Improve The Acquisition
Process 
  65
The last of the general questions asked whether or not
the interviewee had heard of the President’s “skip a
generation of technology” proposal.  Ten of the eleven
respondents answered yes, only one answered somewhat.

C. COMPILED DATA AND ANALYSIS:  SKIPPING A GENERATION OF
TECHNOLOGY AND THE IMPACT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1. Question Area 1
The following question comprised question area 1:
Is there any technology available now that is newer or
better than the technology that you are using in developing
your weapon system and can it be incorporated into the
system you are developing?

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
Of the eleven acquisition professionals
interviewed, nine responded yes.  Most of the technology
that they feel is newer or better is some type of computer
processing capability or improved electronic equipment. 
Examples of improved electronic equipment include command,
control, communication, computers and intelligence (C4I)
technologies, fire control systems, and optical sight
technology.  One of the respondents who answered no, felt
that his program is on the cutting edge of technology with
respect to all aspects of his program.  The eleventh
respondent answered that it is too early in his program’s






The responses make it clear that there is newer
and better technology available to program managers that
can be incorporated into weapon systems as they undergo
development.  This further emphasizes the need to develop
weapon systems using open system architectures and using a
spiral development method to take advantage of computer
processing and electronic equipment technological changes. 
It should be anticipated early that C4I and electronic
equipment will be outdated before the system is fielded. 
Therefore, program managers should carefully plan for
electronic equipment upgrades early in their acquisition
strategy in order to make upgrades cost effective and
prevent schedule slips. 

2. Question Area 2
The following question comprised question area 2:
If your program were to be canceled, how long do you
think it would take before a next generation system could
be developed and fielded?

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
The responses to this question varied from
program to program.  Two of the people working on aircraft
programs stated that it would take anywhere from five to 15
years for a replacement to be developed and fielded.  Two
of the vehicle programs indicated that it could take
anywhere from eight to 20 years.  The ship’s component
program manager responded that it would take six to seven
years.  Three felt that this question did not apply because
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of the nature of the program or because their program was
already fielded.  The last two did not know because they
felt their programs are “next generational.”

b. Analysis
Canceling a major weapon system could set the
Department of Defense back anywhere from five to 20 years
depending on the type of system.  For some systems, it may
not be known how long a replacement system can be fielded
since the program is already working with the latest in
technology.  Therefore, DoD should not cancel any system
without knowing the estimated length of time a replacement
system will take to develop and the potential impact the
cancellation might have on systems already fielded.  In
some cases where DoD is already on the cutting edge of
technology, it may be more reasonable to provide the
program with additional resources to speed up development
than cancel the program, because the replacement systems
may only provide marginal improvements in technology that
do not justify the additional costs incurred.

3. Question Area 3
The following question comprised question area 3: 
What do you think the DoD can do, in the interim, if
your program were to be canceled in order to maintain
current readiness and capabilities (upgrade current





a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
Four of the respondents recommended some kind of
upgrade to the system currently fielded.  However, these
four agreed this would be costly and not provide the same
capabilities that the current system they are developing
will provide.  Four others recommended increasing the
operations and sustainment (O&S) funding for the current
systems to keep them supportable.  Several implied that the
systems they are replacing have subcomponents that are no
longer capable of being manufactured.  One responded that
DoD would have to hope for the best because the hardware
currently being used is obsolete.  Another stated that
without his program, DoD would have to strictly rely on
data generated from modeling and simulation.  The last




Some of the respondents felt that canceling their
program would lead to an increase in O&S costs and
diminishing system performance.  Others felt that some type
of service life extension program (SLEP) would have to be
done to the older systems in order to provide some increase
in capability.  As was presented in Chapter II, O&S costs
during the 1990s have steadily consumed a growing portion
of the DoD budget.  This has left the military with older,
outdated systems that are too costly to maintain. 
Likewise, these older systems’ performance have been
degraded as they continue to age and their operational
availability has decreased.  These rising costs come at the
expense of new programs, as procurement dollars are used to
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supplement O&S costs.  Short-term solutions like SLEP or
increasing O&S funding will not prevent this cycle. 
Therefore, DoD should expect to see the procurement death
spiral accelerated if current programs are canceled.

4. Question Area 4
The following question comprised question area 4:
What do you feel the biggest impact, positive or
negative, cancellation of your program would have on the
Department of Defense?

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
Six of the respondents said canceling their
program would have some kind of negative impact on DoD. 
One of these who responded negatively said that it would
“eliminate the most important transformation enabler in
DoD.”  Another stated that it would cost DoD 10% more each
additional year to maintain the older systems.  Two others
stated canceling their program would put people at risk
while one program manager put it more bluntly, “Marines
would die unnecessarily if we had to fight a real fight in
the next 4-10 years.” 
One respondent answered both positively and
negatively.  He said “positive” in the sense that DoD would
save $10 billion over the life of the program, but
“negative” in that the Army would lose world dominance in
four critical mission areas.  There were two people who





Seven of the eleven indicated that there would be
a negative impact if their programs were canceled.  All of
these respondents are developing major weapon systems. 
Therefore, they believe that canceling a major weapon
system will degrade the capabilities of DoD to fight and
win wars and expose military personnel to higher levels of
risk under combat situations.  Furthermore, some of the
systems are being developed to complement other systems
currently fielded.  Therefore, canceling these systems
potentially can degrade the future combat capability of
existing systems.  
If DoD were to cancel a smaller program, the
impact would be minimal.  Most likely the service
developing the system would be impacted but other services
wouldn’t.  This is best illustrated by one response that
said, “On the macroscopic level – not much.  However, there
could be significantly diminished ship self-protection
capability in the advent of a shooting war.” 

5. Question Area 5
The following statement comprised question area 5:
Please add any additional comments regarding the
impact that skipping a generation of weapons technology
might have on the Department of Defense.  

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
There were two different types of responses to
this request.  One type was clearly skeptical that skipping
a generation would provide DoD with any benefits and felt
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that DoD would fail to capture the technological advances
already being made through existing programs.  The other
side felt that canceling some weapon systems, by making a
vertical budget cut, was a better approach than making a
horizontal cut and reducing all program budgets across the
board.  However, they clarified this position with the
statement that DoD first must address the prolonged
sustainment problems of older systems that will result from




Canceling a weapon system in development must be
done on a case-by-case basis.  Careful consideration must
be made to determine the potential impacts to the services
and to the Defense Department.  A thorough risk assessment
must be done to mitigate the unforeseen consequences that
will occur in the future.  Furthermore, DoD should be
prepared to provide existing systems with additional
resources until the next-generation system is fielded.
That being said, canceling one weapon system
program may be a better strategy than making horizontal
cuts to all programs.  As indicated earlier, unstable
budgets are the major reason weapon systems take a long
time to develop using the acquisition process.  This
strategy will only work, however, if the cost savings are





D. COMPILED DATA AND ANALYSIS:  SKIPPING A GENERATION OF
TECHNOLOGY AND THE IMPACT ON THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL
BASE:
1. Question Area 1
The following question comprised question area 1:
If your program were to be canceled, how do you feel
this would impact your Contractor’s decision to pursue
Government defense contracts in the future?

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
Answers to this question ranged from no impact to
severe depending on the type of contractor.  The
respondents felt that the larger companies that have
several other defense contracts or other commercial
products would not be affected much by a cancellation. 
However, the respondents mentioned that the subcontractors
on these programs would likely go out of business.  One
respondents said, because of the size of the contract, that
some of his contractors “would go out of business, others
would most likely not pursue Government contracts in the
future.”
One respondent explained that he has very little
choice when picking contractors because of the downsizing
that has affected the industry.  Most likely, he said,
cancellation would result in “limiting choices for solution




DoD acquisition professionals interviewed feel
that the bigger defense contractors will likely not be
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affected much by a program cancellation.  However, the
smaller companies who support the prime contractors will
most likely go out of business or not do business with the
Government in the future.  This is very significant because
the amount of outsourcing by contractors is increasing. 
The fact that subcontractors may leave the industry will
have a negative affect on DoD in future acquisition
programs.  Also, the current systems already fielded rely
on smaller companies for spare part support.  Furthermore,
it is likely that future programs will be more costly if
contractors perceive a greater risk doing business with the
Government because of their programs and others that have
been canceled in the past.

2. Question Area 2
The following question comprised question area 2:
Do you feel that your Contractor will be competitive
for bidding on the next generation weapon system?

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
Six of the interviewees responded yes.  Two
responded that some, but not all will be competitive for
future contracts.  One indicated that it is too soon to
tell if his contractor will be competitive.  Another stated
that his contractor had already won the follow-on contract
to his system.  He maintained that this is a problem with
the industry as a whole, in that there is very little
competition.  Also, he mentioned that one of the
unfortunate consequences of the performance specifications
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is that the designs are essentially proprietary, limiting
the amount of competition for follow-on contractors.
The eleventh responded that as long as his
contractors see an opportunity to make a profit, his
contractors would continue to pursue defense contracts.  He
cautions that “if a contract was cancelled and cost the




It is safe to say that all current prime
contractors will be competitive for future contracts.  None
of the respondents indicated that this is a concern. 
However, canceling programs will come at the price of
higher payouts for future contracts later as contractors
try to recoup losses or offset new risks.  

3. Question Area 3
The following question comprised question area 3:
If your program were to be skipped, what are some
things that the Department of Defense and the U.S.
Government could do to keep your Contractor in the defense
industry?

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
Nine out of the eleven respondents answered
either that this is not an issue; the contractor has
already mitigated this risk so it is not necessary; or
none.  Two respondents did provide suggestions.  The other
two said that the Government could provide the contractor
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with some of the sustainment business that would
necessitate keeping the older system operating longer.  In
addition, the Government could fund the contractor for
technology insertions and upgrades to existing systems. 

b. Analysis
Motivating defense contractors to stay in the
defense industry does not seem to be a problem.  Most
contractors either have contracts in other areas of the
defense industry.  However, to alleviate some of the impact
after a program has been canceled, the Government should be
prepared to offer the contractor sustainment and future
upgrade contracts.  These payments may prevent the
contractor from trying to recoup losses on future
contracts.

4. Question Area 4
The following question comprised question area 4:
If your program were to be canceled, do you think your
Contractor will reallocate the resources currently used in
development of your program (i.e. people, equipment,
manufacturing capacity, etc) towards other DoD contracts or
to other company interests? 

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
Ten of the respondents indicated that their
contractors would reallocate resources by moving people and
capital to other projects and/or by laying off workers. 
One of these said “the contractor will downsize some of his
staff” and that this would “create a loss of experience
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that could not be replaced.”  Another said that his
contractor would likely lay some people off and shift the
additional overhead costs to other Government programs. 
The eleventh respondent felt that this question did not
apply to his program.

b. Analysis
The overwhelming number of “yes” answers
indicates that there will be some adverse affect on the
market sectors within the defense industry that has a
program canceled.  This would result in the loss of people
and equipment as they get transferred to other areas of the
defense industry or get laid off.  The impact on DoD will
come in the form of longer development times for similar
programs because the future labor force will have to train
to regain the skills that will be lost.  Likewise, other
existing programs are likely to see increases in labor
prices as these programs absorb the displaced workers.

5. Question Area 5
The following statement comprised question area 5:
Please add any additional comments on the impact that
skipping a generation of weapons technology might have on
your Contractor and/or the defense industrial base you are
working in.

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
Three of the respondents provided additional
comments regarding the impact on the defense industrial
base.  One said that “labor rates on other aviation
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programs would sky rocket possibly causing a wide spread
cost breach” for other aviation programs.  Another said
that the loss of skilled labor used in the production of
his system, if canceled, would take years to rebuild. 
Finally the third respondent stated something similar to
that of the second in that “The real industrial base is




These three statements further emphasized that
biggest impact on the defense industrial base will be the
loss of an experienced labor force.  This experience is
needed to develop the next-generation weapon systems. 
Therefore, DoD will have to strike a balance between
canceling outdated weapon systems currently in development
and protecting the intellectual capital of that market
sector.

E. COMPILED DATA AND ANALYSIS:  FEASIBILITY OF SKIPPING A
GENERATION OF TECHNOLOGY
1. Question Area 1
The following question comprised question area 1:
Do you think it is feasible for DoD to “skip” your
program and still meet the current national threats and the
threats of the future?

a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
The respondents’ answers to this question were
split between yes and no.  Only one person who answered no
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gave an explanation.  He said, “No, it is not feasible. 
This program in essence skips to a much more significant
level of capabilities than the current system.”  
Those that responded yes clarified their
statement with the potential consequences.  One said,
“Feasible yes; desirable from a national security
perspective no.”  Another said that it was feasible with
the expectation of higher costs elsewhere.  Still another
responded, “Yes, as long as sustainment funding is
identified to keep the current fleet out there.”  Finally,
another responded that it was not feasible “without
assuming some risk in the near future.”

b. Analysis
The feasibility of skipping a generation of
technology depends on the program at stake.  Those
respondents that feel their programs are next generational
believe that it is not feasible to skip their program.  The
others believe it is possible but at higher risks and only
if more sustainment funding for older systems is provided. 
These reactions support the divided opinions found in the
literature regarding skipping weapon systems currently in
development that appear to be no longer relevant.

2. Question Area 2
The following statement comprised question area 2:
Please feel free to add any additional comments
relating to the feasibility of skipping a generation of
technology regarding your program or in general.  
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a. DoD Acquisition Professionals’ Responses
Two of the respondents were very concerned with
the idea of skipping a generation of technology.  One
raised a question on how the next generation of technology
will be measured.  He asks, “Do you base it on the next
generation of computer chips which turn over about every 18
months, or the next electronics breakthrough which is about
every 36 months, or the next major weapon system which
takes about 10 years?  The longer the skip the greater the
risk that must be assumed.”  The other was skeptical about
the proposal and was concerned that DoD will start a new
downward spiral.  He said, “If we continue down this path,
we will continue to skip current technology for what
appears to be better and more desirable future technology,
resulting in our inability to ever get to the end game,
fielding new equipment.”  

b. Analysis
The statements above highlight the difficulty of
skipping a generation of weapon systems technology.  They
raise concern that this might be the wrong direction that
DoD is heading.  Instead of skipping technology, they
believe DoD should focused on getting the current systems
in development fielded so that newer and better equipment
will reach the warfighter.

F. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the data for the thesis, a
summary of eleven interviews conducted by the author during
October 2002.  The respondents were DoD acquisition
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professionals from the different services.  The interviews
consisted of ten questions regarding the impact the
skipping a generation of technology would have on the DoD
and the defense industry and, the two questions regarding
its feasibility.  The objective of the interviews was to
answer the primary research questions:
• In systems acquisition management, is it
realistic to skip a generation of weapon system
technology?
• How will the Department of Defense and the
defense industrial base be impacted if weapon
systems currently in development are skipped? 
The questions areas were first presented, and then
followed by a summary of responses.  An analysis of this
data immediately followed each question area response.  The
intent was to identify any major differences in the
experiences and opinions of the interviewees with the
research literature presented in Chapter II.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This thesis has examined the impact that skipping a
generation of technology would have on the Department of
Defense (DoD) and the defense industry.  The desired result
of the study was to determine the feasibility of
implementing the President’s “skipping a generation of
technology” proposal.
In section “B” of this chapter are the answers to the
primary research questions:
• In systems acquisition management, is it
realistic to skip a generation of weapon system
technology?
• How will the Department of Defense and the
defense industrial base be impacted if weapon
systems currently in development are skipped? 
This section also provides recommendations developed
as a result of this study.  Section “C” identifies some
potential areas for future research.

B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Lieutenant General Paul J. Kern, Director of the
Army’s Acquisition Corps stated:
The current acquisition process was good for
producing systems in the Cold War environment,
where we had a predictable enemy with known lead
times.  Now, many of our foreseeable potential
enemies are different:  they are not constrained
by a rigid, inflexible acquisition process.  They
can purchase weapon systems and/or sub components
in an open-air market environment, like a global
of-the-shelf system.  Through mixing a matching
various weapon systems and subsystems, they can
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rapidly generate some very lethal systems.  We
lose if they can purchase and bring together
their systems faster than we can develop ours
because of long cycle times (Johnson, McKeon and
Szanto, 1998).
It is because of this fear that President Bush has
proposed transforming and reforming the DoD acquisition
process.  Getting weapon systems that incorporate the
latest technology and meet our ability to counter national
threats is the ultimate goal of his proposal.  Therefore,
the research conducted in this thesis indicates that it is
possible to skip a generation of weapon system technology
in the developmental process.  However, before the decision
to cancel a program is made, careful consideration must be
made about the impact the cancellation will have on the
supportability of the existing weapon system and the
consequences that will occur for DoD and that sector of the
defense industry.

1. Primary Research Question:  In Systems
Acquisition Management, Is it Realistic to Skip a
Generation of Weapon System Technology?
It is realistic to skip a generation of weapons system
technology.  However, whether it is more or less realistic
depends on the weapon system program.  For weapon system
programs that are already on the cutting edge of
technology, like the Army’s RAH-66 Comanche Scout Light
Attack Helicopter and the Marine Corps’ Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle, cancellation becomes a more difficult
decision.  These programs offer technology that provides a
more significant level of technology than the aging system
they are designed to replace.  Therefore, canceling these
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“next-generational” programs would put DoD anywhere from
five to 20 years further behind current technology. 
Likewise, the steadily increasing operations and
sustainment (O&S) costs needed to sustain the current
systems may negate the perceived benefits from the program
cancellation.
Skipping smaller programs and programs that offer only
marginal improvements in technology, have designs that are
no longer relevant, and when the system it is designed to
replace can be upgraded and maintained at minimal
additional costs, are less difficult decisions.  Skipping a
“non-next generational” weapon system to reprogram DoD or
service funding is a better alternative than making
horizontal programming cuts to several program budgets to
free the same amount of funding.  The unstable budgets of
the past are one of the reasons the acquisition process
takes a long time.
Similarly, canceling weapon system programs in
development that no longer are relevant to the threat
environment that DoD faces, will help facilitate the
transformation of the Defense Department to a light and
mobile force with more high-tech weapons.  The additional
funding obtained through cancellation could provide
additional resources to DoD acquisition priorities and
accelerated their development cycle time.

2. Primary Research Question:  How Will the
Department of Defense and the Defense Industrial
Base Be Impacted if Weapon Systems Currently in
Development Are Skipped?
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The Department of Defense will be impacted through
higher O&S costs to sustain existing weapon systems if
weapon systems currently in development are skipped.  The
acquisition professionals that participated in this study
believe these O&S costs could increase up to 10% per year
for anywhere from five to 20 years depending on the type of
system.  Furthermore, the performance capabilities of the
existing systems are likely to diminish, as they are
extended beyond their intended life span, and will likely
have to undergo service life extension programs.
Skipping weapon systems currently in development will
not affect the large contractors in the defense industry. 
Most of the large defense contractors have diversified in
other areas of the defense industry and the commercial
sector to mitigate this risk.  However, the smaller
companies who support these contractors will most likely go
out of business or not do business with the Government in
the future.  The loss of these subcontractors will have a
negative affect on future DoD acquisition programs and for
some current systems that rely on these smaller companies
for spare parts support.
Perhaps the biggest impact on the defense industrial
base will be the loss of an experienced labor force.  This
experience is needed to develop the next-generation of
weapon systems.  Losing this labor force will affect the
defense industry’s ability to development similar programs
in the future.  Therefore, DoD will need to have a plan in
place prior to canceling weapon systems currently in




Analysis of the data collected and presented




A fifth main area to the “skip a generation of
technology” should be revising the Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPBS).  In order to develop and field
the weapon systems with the latest technology, program
managers need sustained and consistent funding.  Unstable
budgets prevent the timely execution of program schedules. 
Therefore, PPBS should be revised to allow for event driven
program schedules and to give the program manager the
flexibility to reprogram the program’s production and O&S
funds to the research, development, test and evaluation




In order to guarantee that existing weapon
systems are provided sustainment funding, the Executive
Branch officials should ensure that the canceled program’s
funding stays within the Department of Defense, if it is a
joint program, and within the service if a service level
program is canceled.  This will provide the department and
the service with the additional O&S funding needed to
sustain the weapon systems until the next-generation
replacement system is fielded.  Likewise, the department or
service should be allowed to reprogram the canceled
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program’s budget to other alternative programs in
development.  This will help speed the development of other
programs in the acquisition process and ensure that the
warfighter has access to the latest in military technology.

c. Recommendation #3
Program managers should be encouraged to use
open-system architectures when developing weapon systems. 
An open-system architecture will allow for the
incorporation of newer and better technologies when they
materialize.  In particular, open-system architectures
should be used in the areas of the systems that interface
with the computer processing and the electronic components. 
Computer processing and the electronic components have a
two-year technology rate of change. 

d. Recommendation #4
The Government should commit early in the
development process that if the weapon system is canceled,
the Government would provide the same contractor with
sustainment, upgrade and technology insertion contracts for
the weapon system currently fielded.  This will reduce the
contractor’s risk to accept DoD contracts and, will help
keep subcontractors and the experienced labor force in the
defense industry.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The research has highlighted many areas for future
research.  The following areas of study are recommended:
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• Compare the new acquisition guidance issued after
the cancellation of the DoD 5000 series to the
“Skip a Generation of Technology” Proposal.
• Look at how the cancellation of the DoD 5000
series will affect the acquisition process.
• Analyze and make recommendations as to how the
PPBS process can be revised so that Congress
still maintains control but provides more
consistent program funding.
• Perform a cost-benefit analysis of skipping a
weapons system currently in development.
• Give a similar questionnaire to the one used in
this thesis to defense contractors and compare
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APPENDIX A.  NINE TRLS
TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS

Technology Readiness Level Description
1.  Basic principles observed
and reported.
Lowest level of technology
readiness.  Scientific research
begins to be translated into
applied research and
development.  Examples might
include paper studies of
technology’s basic properties.
2.  Technology concept and/or
application formulated.
Invention begins.  Once basic
principles are observed,
practical applications can be
invented.  Applications are
speculative and there may be no
proof or detailed analysis to
support the assumptions. 
Examples are limited to
analytic studies.




Active research and development





elements of the technology. 
Examples include components
that are not yet integrated or
representative.  




are integrated to establish
that they will work together. 
This is relatively “low
fidelity” compared to the
eventual system.  Examples
include integration of “ad hoc”
hardware in the laboratory.















6.  System/subsystem model or
prototype demonstration in a
relevant environment.
Representative model or
prototype system, which is well
beyond that of TRL 5, is tested
in a relevant environment. 
Represents a major step up in a
technology’s demonstrated
readiness.  Examples include
testing a prototype in a high-
fidelity laboratory environment
or in simulated operational
environment.  
7.  System prototype
demonstration in an operational
environment. 
Prototype near, or at, planned
operational system.  Represents
a major step up from TRL 6,
requiring demonstration of an
actual system prototype in an
operational environment such as
and aircraft, vehicle, or
space.  Examples include
testing the prototype in a test
bed aircraft. 
8.  Actual system completed and
qualified through test and
demonstration. 
Technology has been proven to
work in its final form and
under expected conditions.  In
almost all cases, this TRL
represents the end of true
system development.  Examples
include developmental test and
evaluation of the system in its
intended weapon system to
determine if it meets design
specifications. 

9.  Actual system proven
through successful mission
operations. 
Actual application of the
technology in its final form
and under mission conditions,
such as those encountered in
operational test and
evaluation.  Examples include
using the system under
operation mission conditions. 

Table 2 Technology Readiness Levels. (From: DoD








BREADBOARD:  Integrated components that provide a
representation of a system/subsystem and which can be used
to determine concept feasibility and to develop technical
data.  Typically configured for laboratory use to
demonstrate the technical principles of immediate interest. 
May resemble final system/subsystem in function only.

“HIGH FIDELITY”:  Addresses form, fit and function.  High-
fidelity laboratory environment would involve testing with
equipment that can simulate and validate all system
specifications within a laboratory setting.

“LOW FIDELITY”:  A representative of the component or
system that has limited ability to provide anything but
first order information about the end product.  Low-
fidelity assessments are used to provide trend analysis.

MODEL:  A functional form of a system, generally reduced in
scale, near or at operational specification.  Models will
be sufficiently hardened to allow demonstration of the
technical and operational capabilities required of the
final system.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT:  Environment that addresses all of
the operational requirements and specifications required of
the final system to include platform/packaging. 

PROTOTYPE:  A physical or virtual model used to evaluate
the technical or manufacturing feasibility or military
utility of a particular technology or process, concept, end
item or system.
RELEVANT ENVIRONMENT:  Testing environment that simulates
the key aspects of the operational environment.  

SIMULATED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT:  Either 1) a real
environment that can simulate all of the operational
requirements and specifications required of the final
system, or 2) a simulated environment that allows for
testing of a virtual prototype; used in either case to
determine whether a developmental system meets the
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
  93
APPENDIX B.  BREAKDOWN OF EACH TYPE OF WEAPON
SYSTEM CATEGORY




             
Weapon
Sys Type System IOC Date
Retire
Date YearsRemarks  
Aircraft            
A-4 Attack/Fighter 1956 1985 29 Replaced by the AV-8B in the Marine Corps (1)  
A-6 Attack/Fighter 1963 1997 34 Phased out in 1997 (1)  
A-7 Attack/Fighter 1966 1992 26 Last active-duty squadron in 1992 (1)  
AV-8B Attack/Fighter 1985 2018 33 USMC expects to operate AV-8Bs until 2018 (1)  
A-10 Attack/Fighter 1977 2008 31 Upgrades in 2001 will maintain capability to 2008 (1)  
A-37 Attack/Fighter 1967 1987 20 Replaced by the OA-10 (1)  
F-4 Attack/Fighter 1961 1989 28 Navy retired in 1986, USMC in 1989 (1)  
F-14 Attack/Fighter 1973 2008 35 Expected to remain in service at least until 2008 (1)  
  Attack/Fighter Average   29.5    
B-52 Large F. Wing 1955 2030 75 Air Logistics Command estimates use until 2030 (1)  
C-9 Large F. Wing 1966 2015 49
Estimate, likely to remain in service well into the 21st
Century (2)  
C-22 Large F. Wing 1963 2003 40 Projected FOC date for replacement is FY 2003/4 (3)  
C-135 Large F. Wing 1957 2040 83
AMC is charged with maintaining the KC-135 fleet until 2040
(4)  
C-130 Large F. Wing 1956 2028 72
30 yr life est for C-130J, Congress approved acq."J's" in
1998 (5)  
C-141 Large F. Wing 1965 2005 40 C-17 due to replace the C-141 in 2005 (1)  
P-3 Large F. Wing 1962 2015 53 Multi-Mission Aircraft to replace the P-3 in 2015 (1)  
  Large F. Wing Average   58.9    
AH-1 Helicopter 1967 2035 68
AH-1Z est. service of 30 yrs, the re-man. will add 10,000 flt
hrs (6)  
CH-46 Helicopter 1962 2013 51 2013 the MV-22 will become the transport for the USMC (1)  
CH-47 Helicopter 1962 2014 52 Upgrade program will start in 2002 and end in 2014 (1)  
CH-53 Helicopter 1966 2025 59 CH-53E to be operational until 2025 (7)  
OH-58 Helicopter 1968 2020 52 Army scheduled to keep OH-58's until 2020 (1)  
  Helicopter Average   56.4   
Aircraft Averages     48.3    
Table 3. Aircraft Life Span Analysis.

(1) Ref:  Periscope, 2002.
(2) Ref:  Boeing, 2002. 
(3) Ref:  Davis, April 19, 2000.
(4) Ref:  Stevenson, October, 12, 1999.
(5) Ref:  Lockheed Martin Press Release, August 24, 1998.
(6) Ref:  FAS/AH-1W, December 27, 1999.
(7) Ref:  FAS/CH-53, January 7, 1999.
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Artillery          
M107 175mm Self-Propelled 1963 1981 18 Converted to M110s in 1981 (1)
M114 155mm Towed 1942 1980 38 The M198 was introduced in the early 1980's (1)
M109 155mm Self-Propelled 1963 2008 45
Replacement Crusader, was scheduled for IOC in
2008 (1)
M110 203mm Self-Propelled 1963 1995 32 Phased out of service in the 1990s (8)
           
Artillery Averages     33.3 
           
Ground Combat
Vehicles          
M163 Vulcan Air Defense 1968 1991 23 Retired after being withdrawn from Europe (1)
LAV-150 Arm. Per. Car 1964 2015 51
LAV structural integrity is sustainable at least
through 2015 (9)
M113 Arm. Per. Car 1959 2006 47
Plans for a new vehicle call for integration in
2006 (10)
AAV7 Amph. Aslt 1972 2008 36 Will be replaced by the AAAV (1)
LVTP-5 Amph. Aslt 1956 1974 18 Out of service by the USMC in 1974 (1)
M88 ARV Combat Sup 1961 1996 35 Existing M88A1s are to be converted to M88A2s (1)
M1 Abrams Tank 1978 2020 42 Army to continue M1A2 production through 2020 (1)
M60 Tank 1961 1997 36
All M60 series tanks were to be replaced in 1997
(11)
           
Ground Combat Vehicles Averages   36  
           
Missiles/
Rockets/Torpedoes          
AGM-114 Anti-Tank 1985 2020 35 Estimate, upgrade to be in service by 2007 (12)
AGM-78 Anti-Radar 1968 1984 16 Retired in 1984 after the F-105 was disposed of
AGM-45 Anti-Radar 1963 2000 37 Scheduled to remain in service until 2000
AIM-4F Anti-Air 1956 1988 32 Retired in 1988
AIM-7 Anti-Air 1958 2010 52 Estimate, AIM-7M production ended in 1990
AIM-54 Anti-Air 1974 2008 34 Used on the F-14, F-14 retirement date is 2008
Mk 46 Torpedo 1966 2015 49
Expected to remain in Navy service until 2015
(13)
NT-37 Torpedo 1974 2027 53
NAMS is committed to supporting NT-37 for 25
years (14)
Missiles/Rockets/Torpedoes Average 38.5 
Table 4. Artillery, Ground Combat Vehicles, and
Missiles/Rockets/Torpedoes Life Span Analysis.

(1) Ref:  Periscope, 2002.   (12) Ref:  Jane’s/AGM-114, October 13, 2000.
(8) Ref:  FAS/M110A2, September 12, 1998. (13) Ref:  United States Navy Fact File, 2002.
(9) Ref:  FAS/LAV, December 20, 2001.  (14) Ref:  Scott, 2002.
(10) Ref:  FAS/M113A1, February 5, 2000. 




      
      
Weapon Sys Type System Commiss Decomm Years Remarks 
      
Ships/Class           
Nimitz Aircraft Carrier 1975 2025 50 Service life expected to be 50 years (15) 
Kitty Hawk Aircraft Carrier 1961 2018 57 John F. Kennedy to be decommissioned in 2018 (1) 
Forrestal Aircraft Carrier 1955 1998 43 Independence decommissioned in 1998 (1) 
 Aircraft Carrier Average  50  
Tarawa Amphibious 1976 2010 34 Scheduled to be replaced by Wasp class in 2010 (1) 
Austin Amphibious 1964 2008 44 Last LPD scheduled for retirement in 2008 (1) 
Anchorage Amphibious 1969 2007 38 Last LSD scheduled for retirement in 2007 (1) 
 Amphibious Average  38.7  
Knox Frigate 1969 1995 26 Entire class was stricken in 1995 (1) 
O. H. Perry Frigate 1977 2021 44 Last ship in class to be decommissioned in 2021 (1)
Virginia Cruiser 1976 1998 22 Last ship in class decommissioned in 1998 (1) 
Long Beach Cruiser 1961 1995 34 Decommissioned in 1995 (1) 
California Cruiser 1974 1999 25 Entire class was stricken in 1999 (1) 
Bainbridge Cruiser 1962 1996 34 Decommissioned in 1996 (1) 
Kidd Destroyer 1981 1999 18 Last ship in class decommissioned in 1999 (1) 
F. Sherman Destroyer 1955 1983 28 Last ship in class decommissioned in 1993 (1) 
C. F. Adams Destroyer 1959 1992 33 Last ship in class decommissioned in 1992 (1) 
 Frigate/Cruiser/Destroyer Average 29.3  
Sturgeon Submarine 1967 2000 33 Last ship in class decommissioned in 2000 (1) 
Ethan Allen Submarine 1962 1985 23 Last ship in class decommissioned in 1985 (1) 
Permit Submarine 1967 1996 29 Last ship in class decommissioned in 1996 (1) 
Narwhal Submarine 1969 1999 30 Decommissioned in 1999 (1) 
LaFayette Submarine 1963 1994 31 Last ship in class decommissioned in 1994 (1) 
GP Lipscomb Submarine 1974 1990 16 Decommissioned in 1990 (1) 
Ben FranklinSubmarine 1965 1999 34 Last ship in class decommissioned in 1999 (1) 
  Submarine Average   28  
      
Ships Average     36.5  
      
      
Table 5. Ships Life Span Analysis.
(1) Ref:  Periscope, 2002.
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